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Improving to Pay Estimates 
for Quality Improvements through Joint 
Estimation with Quality Perceptions 
John C. WhiH:head* 
Willingness 10 pay for qllality C'h:lflgc may depend on hcterogerM!ou~ pcrcei\· .. :d quality lcl·els. 
Cootingent valuation lotOOie5 should include mea;,urcs of qllality pcrt:Cption~ as coyariates 111 the 
willingness to pay model in order 10 a,\'oid omiued variable bias. Variation in quality pcrception, 
aeross respondents leads to a polC'ntial cndogencity of qllality pcrcept ion~. 1 address the potenti;11 for 
endogeneity bi<ls using an instruntental v:.riablcs appro:lCh in which <I ll1ea~urc of quality pcn:cptioll~ 
i~ included as a detenninanl of willingness 10 pay and is simult:IIK'Ou~ly detennincd by various 
cxogenous faelors. The willingness to pay model is el>lirmtted jointly wilh quality perceplions 
allowing for correlation of the error tenn~. Using data on willingncss to pay for water 4uality 
improvements ill the Neuse River in Nonh Carolina. I reject ellogeneily of perceived "Iu;lllty. 
Correcting for endogencity improve.~ the measurement of willing.IC's to pay by differcn1i31illlO 
willingness 10 pay among I\'sportdcnll> with heterogellCQU~ quallly pcrccptions. 
JEI. Classification: QS I. QS) 
I. Introduction 
TIle cOllIingem valuation melhod (CV M) is a s lated preference approach 10 Ihe measurement of 
the value of changes in the llilocation of nonmarkel environment:!1 and naturJI resources (Mitchell and 
Carson 1989). The CVM h:!s clear :ldvallIages when compared to revealed preference rnethod~ in 
which actual behavior is used to develop estimates of value (e.g., hedonic price method, IrJvcl cost 
method). Stated preference methods are most useful when an t'x alltl! policy analysis must consider 
propos.11s that are beyond the mnge of historical experience. TIle CVM is more flexible than the 
revealed preference methods. allowing Ihe estimation of the impacts of a wide mnge of policies. The 
CVM can be used to estimate nonuse values (i.e .. passive usc v;t lues) and ex (Jllt(' willingness to pay 
under unccnainty (Whitehead and Hlomquisl 1006). 
Several issues indicate Ihm the CVM is not a flawl ess approach to measuring environmental 
values for policy analys is. 1 The melhodologic;t l challenges include the potential for hypothetical bias . 
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temporal bias. sensi tivi ty of willingnc~~ 10 P;IY cstim;ltcs to muhipan policy (i.e .. embedding. 
se(IUencing). and the bias of a rel iance on willingness to pay. relative to willingness to accept 
questions. when the appropriatc propeny rights :Ire held hy the respondent (Whitehead and Blomquist 
2006). Hoehn and Randall ( 1987) define a "satisfactory benefi t cost indicator" as one that docs nOl 
ovenaatc the present value of net bene/i ts of policy. More methodological researeh is needed before 
I can conclude Ihat the CVM estim.l1es of wi llingness to pay are satisfaclOry benciit-cost indic;l ton;, 
For example. if willingness to pay suffers from hypothctical bias. benefi ts will be overestimated. 
Nevenhdess. the CVM (:lI1d other st:lted prefcrence appro;lchcs) is thc only option for estimation of 
the benefits of;l broad nlllge of policy questions. 
This paper addresses a potential problem where willingness 10 pay statements are based on 
subjecti ve perceptions about the environmenwl (IUality change instead of the Objective change that is 
prescribed by the pol icy. In this case. willingness to pay may be biased if the subjective ch;mge 
in quality diverges from the objective change. I argue that standard altempts to control for this 
divergence m:l)' fail. An alternative in~lrumenw! variables al)proach is introduced that may improve 
the accur;lcy of willingness 10 pay estimate~. 
In the next section I describe the rel;ltionship between willingness to pay and quality perceptions. 
I then describc the l)Otenti;l! empirical problem. Next. the empirical willingness to pay modd is 
fonnally described. nlC survey uscd to collect the data ;md the dilla used to implement the model :Ire 
also described. The application is to water (IUali ty improvements in the Neuse Ri ver. Nonh Carolina. 
Empirical resulls using IWO different (IUality measures are presented, Conclusions and suggestions 
for future rescilrch follow. 
2. Willingness to Ilay nnd Quality Perceptions 
The theoretical con:.tmction of willingness \0 p;l)' fOf quality improvement shows that 
willingness \0 pay is a function of pl\!policy and l)Ostpolicy quality levels. among olher variables 
(Whitehead 1995). CV I\1 surveys should carefully describe bolh qu;\l iIY levels ;md ask for respondent 
willingness to pay for the change in quality (Mitchell and Carson 1989). A crucial assumption is 
Ihat respondents are villuing the objeclivc quality change that the survey asks the,m to value. n lis 
assumption may 110t hold in many applic:uion~. espcci;lll)' those in which one or both quality levels 
are not exp!icitly described and when hcterogem:olls respondents have varying levels of prior 
infonllation about the quality change. 
For cx;mlple. in a well-funded study that employed in-person interviews. Carson and Mitchell 
( 1993) thoroughly describe baseline national water quality as '"nOI boatable" and improved water 
quality ;IS '"bo;t1able. fishable. and swi mmable'" using visl1;,1 aids and extensive text. In eontmst. many 
CVM research budgets ;Ire not adequate to pursue ell tensive descriptions of existing quali ty and 
changes in quality. With ~maller rcsearch budgets that may lead \0 mail or telephone intcrviews. 
imponalll text detailing Ihe environmelllal tlUali ty change may be discarded. For example. in the C VM 
applic:uion presented herc. rcsl)Ondems arc asked to value a wilter qual ity improvement from the 
current water quality level to a water (iliali ty level that is fishable. swimmable. and drinkable. TIle 
current water quality is not cxplicitly described \0 respondents during the telephone interview. I rely 
on existing respondent knowledge about current water quality. 
Hctcrogeneous respondents may have varying subjective perceptions aboul the current en-
vironmental qU;llity level ;tIld the hypothetical changes described during the CVM interview. This may 
be true even when current qU;ll ity and thc quality change ;m! thoroughly described. as in Carson and 
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Mitchell (1993). but it is especially true when the quality ch;mge is not explicitly described and 
assuming that perceptions :lbout qu .. lity are homogeneous, In thc current application. some might 
consider current water quality to be too poor for fishing and swimming. Other respondents might 
consider current watcrquality to be fishable but nOl swimmable. With either explicitly described quality 
change or implicitly understood quality change. CVM questions el icit willingness to pay values that 
may vary b:ll.Cd on differences in respondent qU:llity perceptions. The variation in willingness to pay due 
to the vari:llion in quality perception will nOl be aceoun!ed for by the researcher who ignores the dif· 
ferences in qu,llity perceptions across respondents. adding 10 the error of the willingness to pay estimates. 
Ignoring the divergence between perceivcd quality and objective <I u .. lity (i.e .. quali ty as dcscribed 
in the survey) in empirical models of willingness to p:ly leads to the well·known omitted variable 
problem. For examples of studies that may suffer from omilled variable problems. Hurley. 0110. and 
Holtkamp( 1999)estimate the willingness to pay for delaying nitrate contamin:llion in drinking water and 
Stumborg. Bacrenklau. and Bishop (2001) estimate the willingness to pay for a reduction in phosphorus 
pollution in lakes. In both cases the perceived quality change is likely to vary across respondents. Neither 
of these studies includes measures of altitudes or perceptions about the pollution problcm in their models 
of willingness to pay. These omiued variables may cause bias in the estimates of cocflicients on variables 
that are correlated with perceived environmental quality. More genernlly. omined variable bias may help 
explain some poor results from CVM rc:.carch. such as poor filS and even unexpected signs. 
One solution to the omitted quality variable problem is to include a proxy variable for quality 
in the model. In the case of willingness to pay for quality improvements the approach is to elicit 
perceived quality. or variables that may be relatcd !O quali ty (e.g .. :lIIitudes, satisfOlction rntings). from 
survey respondents and include these measures as dctenninants of willingness to pay. Many CVM 
studies have followed this approach. For example. K wak. Lee. and Russell (1997) and Yoo and Yang 
(2001) measure status quo drinking water quality with scale variables measuring "the respondent's 
:l1Iitude toward current tap water quality" and "degree of satisfaction the respondent has with current 
tap watcr quality." Both studies find th:1I as the proxy for current drinking water quality increases. 
willingness to pay decreases. 
Most studies that include (IUality I>crceptions in the willingness to P.1y model ignore thc r<lct that 
varying subjective quality perceptions :jre due to the hetcrogencity of respondents and the infonnation 
and altitude~ that they bring to the CV M survey. In contrnst. Danielson et al. (1995) estimate the 
dctenninants of perceived air and water quality and find that they depend on demographics. 
environmental knowledge. and environmental altitudcs, 111is :Ipproach iliustrJtes a problem with 
including quality perccptions in willingness to pay models. Quality perceptions may be affected by thc 
same unobserved characteristics that influence willingness to pay. If unobserved t:js tes arc correlatcd 
with both perceived quali ty and willingness 10 pay. the coefficient on Ihe <lualilY perception variable 
will be biased in a willingness to pay regression model. The bias is due to the correlation in the error 
tellllS in the willingness 10 pay and quality perceptions models. Including the perceived quality variable 
wi thout accounting for the correlation in the error tenns will cause the perceived quali ty variable and 
the willingness to p:IY error lenn to be correlated. biasing the coefficient on the quality variable. 
3. !\'lodel 
The empirical willingncss to pay model for a quality improvement that Je;jds to a constant 
improved qUllJity is 
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where ~ is a coefficient veclor. fl is ,I lone coeffi cicnl. XI, is a vcctor of indcpcndent variables 
including ,I constant. income. and othcr variablcs Ih;l1 1ll;IY ;tffcci willingness 10 pay. and qi is 
perceivcd currelll quality. i = I ..... II individuals. Omission of Ihe currenl qualily variable results in 
Ihe following model 
(2 ) 
where Ihe ncw error Icon. e" = Ik/, + &1,' is nOI independelll of the ex planalory vOlriables if perceived 
quality is correlated with any of the elements of the X I, vector. violating one of the classical 
,.ssumptions of regression analysis. This violalion will cause bias in Ihe cocfficiellls on Ihe vOlriables 
of XI; that are correlated with perceived quality. 
Including perceived qualily as an indepcndcnl variable can pOlcnlially cause endogencilY bias. 
The currentlevcl of quality is" subjcctive measure of quality th,lt varies across individuOIls. q,. Quality 
can be explained by the model 
(3 ) 
where y is a coefficicnt vector. X2; is a vector of variOlbles thOlt cxplain the variation III perceivcd 
<Iual ity, and &2, is a nOnllally distributcd crror ICnll. 
Substitution of Equation 3 into Equation I yields 
(4) 
If thc samc unobservcd factors innucnce both perccived (IUality and willingncss to pay. the correlation 
in crror tCnllS will cause correlation in the quality variable and the error tcnn in the willingness to 
pay model. The correlation will bias the coefficient on quality. fl. Posilive correlalion will bias the 
coefficient upward while ncgative correlation will bias the coefficient downward. 
An instrumental variables tcchnique can be used to avoid the endogeneilY bia.~. In the application 
described below Ihe willingness to pay variable is continuous and censored at zero 
WTP _ {WTP. 
- 0 
if \VTp· > O. 
if \VTp· < 0, (5) 
whcre WTP'" is Ihe unobserved lrue willingness 10 pay. In Ihis ease the Tobil model is appropriate. 
The testing and correction for endogeneity bias is implemented wilh a simultaneous equ3tions model 
in which quality 3nd willingness to pay 3re jointly eSlirnated 
\vrp, = <x'X I< + Ik/, + c." 
q, = y' Xb + Cb , 
p = corr[c l" cbi. (6) 
The eSlimmion method is fu ll infomlalion m,lximum likelihood, allowing for correlalion in the 
nOnllally diSlributed error tenllS, p. The test for the e~ogencity of qi in the independent willingness 10 
p;.y model is a I-test for p = 0. The model is described in Smith ,lIld Blundell (1986) and estimated 
with the LlMDEP econometric softw;lfC (Greene 2002).2 
The vllriables in the Xl , vector but not in the XI' vector arc the identifying variables. These 
variables shou ld h'IVC high c~plan;Jtory power in the instrumenting (i.e .. quality) equation ,md low 
! s~ Whl1ehead (2005) rOT an01her applicalion. 
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correlation with willingness to pay ,lIld ils error lenn. I lest Ihis la~1 condilion wilh a Hassman-type 
idelllificmion tes!. I regress the error lenns from Ihe jointly c~limaled willingne~~ 10 pay model on 
all of [he explanatory v:triables 
(7) 
where £Ir are lhe re,iduals from Ihe will ingnes!<> 10 pay regres!<>ion, li is a vector of coefficient!<>, ,lIld 
I), is a nonnally distributed error lenn. 11lc lest stalistic is the product of the sample size and the 
R2 value <lnd is distributed chi-squared wilh degrees of freedom equal to Ihe number of variables in 
the X2, veclor.j. minus Ihe number of variables in the XI' veclor.l.... minus I 
(8) 
If the test st:llislie i!<> less than the erilieal value. then I conclude the model is properly identified. 
4. Dil!:t 
The data are from a 1998 --landowner ~urvey to evalu;Itc implememation of beSI management 
practices" in the Neuse River basin in Nonh Carolina (Hoban and Cl ifford 1(99). A .Iotr.llified random 
sample telephone survey of landowocN from the 12 count ies of the upper. middle. and lower Neuse 
River basin wal> cmployed. All summary .Iolalistics and empirical results are weighted 10 renect the 
geogmphic and fanll/nonfann stmliticalion of [he sample. The telephone survey response r.lle 
(completions divided by completions plu~ refusals) is 75%. A fl er deleting ellses wilh miss ing da!:1 on 
variables used in this study. the s:1Il1ple .Ioile is 663 for a 48.7% useable rcsponl>C f:lle. 
Survey rc.lopondems arc presented with Ihe contingent valuation scenario: "We 1I1ready pay for 
government environmental programs Ihrough taxes. water bill:>.. and other means. However. 
government will need more money if water quality in the Neu~ River is 10 be protected. This money 
would pay for govemment program~ 10 control pollulion. monilor waler qual ity. prolect fish habitat. 
:md cduc,uc people :Iboui ways II) reduce pOllution. The gO;II would be to make sure wmer quality in 
the Neuse River is safe enough for fishing, ~wimming. and drinking treated water from Ihe river. " A 
popular appl"OllCh for eliciting willingrlC.Ios 10 pay is Ihc dichotomous choice (OC) que~tion . With a OC 
que.loliol1 respondcnt!<> are asked whcther they would be willing to pay a mndornly a~signed dollar 
amO\lnt (e.g., SA I) for the improvement in (IUality. This single question is relalively easy to answer 
but provides :t limiled amount of infon11:1tion :lbou[ willingness to pay. TI1C OC valuation question in 
this siudy is " Would you ,lIld your household be will ing to pay SA I each year for these programs. if 
you knew the money would be used 10 make sure water (IUalilY in lhe Neuse Ri ver is safe?"' The 
randomly assigncd dollar, hereafl er tax. amounl in the tiP't willingness to plly que~tion (A I ) took on 
nine values with a random Stan r.U1ging from SIO 10 S2oo. The tax amounlS were pretested to 
detennille whelher the mnge covered the expeclcd mnge of willingness 10 pay. ~ 
Follow·up llemtive bidding (18 ) DC (IUeSlions with Ihe next highesl or lowesl tax amount 
provide more infomMtion about wi l1ingne~s to pay. When respondents eh:mge their answcr in 
response 10 a change in the tax (e.g., yes/no. no/yes) the reSj)onses are used 10 conslruet upper and 
lower bounds for individual wil1ingne!'>s 10 pay <IIld the continuou~ willingne~), 10 (Xly variable is 
, A C1\ICl:lt 1<'<1 of ,mernat "alldlly of OC .. ·,lhn"IC~' 10 pay " lhe rclalKJn,lup be,"'""n lhe ""'!"""kn,' < .. 'Ihngne>. '0 pa)' rhe 
OO!ot of tbe potlC)' and .he magnlludc of 1hc ~O!'I . A. the C<.>!'I n-.e-;. lhe propot1l00 of =ponoknl.< ""ttm, IQ pay ~Id fatl. 
~ first )"cs.{no "'>ponS<'~ in ,h" 3pplicatllllt 1"''' III" crociat validity le>1 The</:" n:~ults "'" available from the aurhl)f. 
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Table I. D:ua for 663 Cases 
Variahie' [)::<enphoo Me:lrl SO 
MAXWTP Maximum willingncl>s to pay (1998 S) 75.95 70.57 
WQRATE Pcrception of gcneml watcr quality 2.46 0.73 
WQDRINK Perccption of drinking walcr quality 3.03 0.82 
Al Randomly assigned tux amount 103.13 62.44 
INCOME FlImily income (in lOOOs. 1997 S) 71.29 61.50 
RURAL I if rcspondcm is ruml residcm 0.52 0.50 
SEIYrlC I if rcspondcm has septic tank 0.64 0.48 
PRIVWELL I if respondent gcts water from priVaiC well 0.41 0.49 
PROPERTY I if propeny is ncar watcr 0.37 0.48 
NPS I if respondcnt has heard of non-point source pollution 0. 16 0.37 
PFIESTER I if respondent has heard of Pfiesteria 0.77 0.42 
WATERSI-ID I if respondcnt ha;. hcard of watershed 0.77 0.42 
NONWI-IITE I if respondent is nonwhitc 0.14 0.35 
FEMALE I if respondcnt is fcmalc 0.43 0.49 
AGE agc 5 1.09 14.75 
FARM I if fam ily owns fann 0.35 0.48 
mea.~un.-d at the midpoint between the bounds. For respondcllls who are not willing to pay $10. 
wiJlingllCl>s to pay is cqualto the response to thc follow-up question: "'What is the mQStthat you and 
your household would be willing to ]>.1Y e .. ch year for these programsT' For respondents who are 
willing to P;IY 5200 thc willingnt."Ss to p;.y variable is conservatively top--coded at 5200.4.3 
The avemge maximum will ingness to pay for the quality improvemcnt. MAXWTP. is $76 
(Tlible I). The largest group of respondents is willing to pay zero (29%). The next largest groups of 
respondents are willing 10 pay 562.50 (15%). $112.50 (12%), and $200 (I I %). In the othcr catcgories. 
17% are willing to polY between zcro and $37.50. about 11% are wi ll ing to pay between $137.50 and 
5 18750. and 5% are willing 10 pay 587.5. 
I use two wOlter quality perception variables to implement the model. ' ne first is the gencr.tl 
question (WQRATE): "When you th ink of walcr quality please consider its suitability for various uses 
(such OIS swimming. fishing. or drinking). Would you say it is exccllent. good, fair. or poor?" TIle 
second quality variable is specific to drinking water (WQDR INK): "'1·low would you rate the quali ty 
or purity or your home drinkin& water as it I,:omc. . from the faucet'! Would you say il is excellent , 
good. fair. or poorT For each of the watcr clualilY variables the scale variable is increasing in qU:llity. 
~ In Ihl' paper t usc: Ihe 1 B '" Illmgnc" 10 pay ' 1I1Ce " f:ocilllal,,' lhe joinl ~Iilllali,," o f wilhllG-lIess 10 pay and qu;tluy pe=puon, 
wllh e~"''''g tcOIlOIlle'fl(" ..... £1 ... = to"",...., 20(2). Wh""he:ad. Hoban . and ClllfOftl (200 I) ,,,,d >Orne cvitkocc ,h3' lhe IIJ W,'3 
nlay be I"\"f~~ o"er DC dala In lenn, of chtlllng u.hd VFfl' eSUmalts. "The 18 approach. ho,,'c'·N. introduce, ''''0 I)lpe' 
of bo", ,ha, Iypt(":llly dnve " -lllInlll>CSS 10 pay ~"'TW'" do"," .. -:ud: anchon"S (i.e .• SlaJllng pOI", boas) and IOccnhve 
IlII;1)InpatllHh,) (e" .• Wllll~head. llobion. and Clifford 2001; Whllehead 2(02). I u~ ~.aUhon IIpOO Ihosc resc:=1!m; ,,'110 
~y be C()n.Klcnng.a ""....,fil'r:ul,f~r utn'l§<: .. "h Ihr , .. llIngness 10 pay C$um:ues. 
~ "The nlldpo,nl melhod for ~Illlllng val...,,; .. "Inn .. 11I1Ognr» to pa) inlt .... ·ats (":ato "':ad 10 blasnl codficienl :and WIllingness 
10 pay e<llInaleS If lhe mldpo",1 value, :Ill: IlOl ttjual 10 lhe c'~1W value of '" Ilhngne."» to p;oy . C;uno;:ron and lIuppen (1 \18<;1) 
u,", lhe ,,"erv~t d~la modd and sho ... lhe b,a, Ih~, n:,u\15. .. hen lhe daw obIamed from ,he mldpolnl melhod IS u~ ... "h 
ordmary lea'l Sllu ;I./"CS rcg",sSloo. "The choIce of elllplncal model In Ih,s shldy dcpc:n(h on eonlhc hng as~ls of lhese dala. lk 
",lkr lhe intervals lhe gn:alcr chance of bl~~ If "nerval n:g",ssioo is nOi u~. lk g""a'~f .he ra.io of I.cm ""llIIIgnes, 
10 P'lY values 10 l)Osi'''·c willingnc"",, 10 IIaY values Ihe gn:~tCf ch:lrlce of bia< if Tob,' n:grc"ion .. IlOl u~d. The"'!: dala eon· 
lam a hIgh r:thO of ~_ero value, and n:lalwc1y "Jrro'" nUl·rval,. so I proceed wilh lhe Tob .. lIIodel. Using ~im,lar d~'a. 
Whllchead. Iloban. :tI1d Ctifford (1 'J9S) find ooly ""'KIf d,lfc,.,.,n.:es be,ween eocfhelenl C'lIrnalcs and wllhngness '0 pay val"", 
""''''ccn Ihr Tobll arid 100e .... ·al "',I1!"1OO ok>del,. 
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Excellent water qual ity is coded at 4. good is coded at ), fa ir is 2. and poor is I . Fony- two percent 
consider general water quali ty 10 be fair. 4 1% consider il good. and 1)% consider il poor. Only 4% 
consider geneml water quality excel lent Fifty-one percent rale drinking water quality good. 26% rate 
it excellent. 19% rate it fair. and only 4% ratc it poor. 
Several dummy variables measure the respondent'~ proximity to water and water-related 
problems (Table I ). RURAL is equal to one if the respondent's horne is in a rural area. SEPTIC is 
equal to one if the respondent 's home has a septic tank. PRIVWELL is equal to one if the respondent 
gets their waterfrom a private wel l. PROPERTY is equal 10 one iflhe respondent's propeny is located 
next 10 any rivers, streams. or olher bod je.~ of water. 
Dummy variables measure whether the respondent has heard of lhe tenn watershed 
(WATERSHD). non- point source pollution (NPS), and Pfiesleria (PFIESTER). Several socioeco-
nomic variables are included in the analy~is. NONW HITE is equal to one if the respondent is black, 
American Indian. A~ian. or Mixed Race and equal to lero if whi te. FEMALE is equal 10 one if the 
respondent is female. AGE is the age of the respondent. FARM is equal to one if the respondent is pan 
of the fann sample. and INCOME is the respondent's family income (in thousands of 1997 dollars). 
5. Results 
I estimate independent and joint quality/willingness to pay models for Ihe two qual ity variables. 
I usc all exogenous variables as instrumental variables in the X2, vector. Quality is specified to de-
pend on the lax amount , income, knowledge, water-related. and socioeconomic v<lriables. I have no 
(j priori expectutions of the signs of the coeffi c ients in the quality model. The demogmphic vari-
ables are excludcd in the X Ii vector and ~erve as the identifying variables. I chose these demogmphic 
variables as the identifying variables bcc<luSC they are strongly related to perceived quality and 
unrelated 10 willingness to pay, 11le willingness to P.1y equation is specified to depend on the tax 
amount income. knowledge, water-related variables, and perceived quality. 
The coeffi cient on the tax amou nt will be statist ically signi fican t if the data are subject to staning 
])Oint bias.6 The cocflkicnt on INCOME will be positive (neg,ltive) if quality is a nonnal (inferior) 
good. The coeffi cient on the quality v,triable is expected to be negative; higher perceived qUlllity 
leads to lower willingness to pay for quality improvements, I have no a IJriori expectations for the 
signs of the o ther coeffi cients in the will ingness to pay mode l. 
General Warer QUOlifY 
Perceived general water quality (WQRATE) increases with income and if the respondent gets 
their drinking water from a private well (Table 2). Perceived water quality is lowcr if the respondents' 
propeny is located near water or if Ihcy had heard of the tenn watershed, No other coefficient on the 
independent variables is statistically significant. The model has low explanatory power. 
[n the independently estimated will ingness 10 pay model. the coefficient on the tax amount is 
statistically different from zero. indicllting staning point bias. The cocfticient on income indicates that 
• If the ""pondenl mellor" h" Of her answc,", to lhe: follo ... ·up valua!lon qUC:~!lOOS becau~ o f tlx- percCpllOO Ih:ll lhe first tll 
amount is ··about nghf' or for some OIlier ",.:a.~ then the final ""lltngrocs. 10 pay Nimal<' is biased to,",ard the starting III 
amount. Anchonng • .... U up"'ardly (do""n ... "3rdly) bt:as the ... i[[ingrocs~ to pay c","l3tC if the a"crage of the Slaning Ill. amounlS 
is greater (Io"'cr) Ihan the sample's true ",ll'"g""" 10 1"') "aluc (Whllehead. lIoban. and Clifford (995). SInce the III mlOOnt 
" randomly IS~lgned and not correlalcd .... l1h 01"", ,"dependent >'ariable< .• lanmg ['IOlnl bias WIll not affe(Ct lhe resuits Ihat arc 
IIIe foeu< of Ihi< pilper. 
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Table 2. Wi ll ingness to Pay and Quality Models: WQRATE 
Independent JOllit 
WQRATE MAXWTP WQRATE MAXWTI' 
Cocff. I r::nio C<kff. I rat;o Coeff. I 1:11;0 C<kff. I rallo 
ONE 2.416 14.94 18.608 l.08 2.298 15.66 403.223 2.65 
AI 0.000 0.94 0.309 5.54 0.000 0.77 0.351 3.86 
INCOME 0.001 2.26 0.110 1.88 0.00 1 3.04 0.305 2.61 
RURA L - 0.054 - 0.65 - 29.094 - 3.00 - 0.058 - 0.70 - 24.114 - 1.42 
SEPTIC - 0.021 - 0.24 15.366 1.42 - 0.084 - 0.94 4.055 020 
PRI VWELL 0.311 4.51 -11.966 -1.38 0.284 4. I 3 32.140 1.34 
PROPERT Y - 0.143 - 2.43 22.519 3.07 - 0.090 - I .51 5.333 0.39 
NPS 0.040 0,49 - 4.702 - 0,48 - 0.0 12 - 0.15 2.715 0.17 
PFIESTER - 0.116 - 1.60 10.530 1.20 - 0.122 - 1.59 - 17.168 - 1.03 
WATERSHD - 0.121 -1.63 5.205 0.59 -0. 175 - 2.36 - 2.952 - 0.19 
NO NW HITE - 0.008 - 0.09 0.018 0.30 
FEMA LE 0.046 0.70 - 0.059 - 1.35 
AG E 0.(0) 0.41 0.005 2.62 
FA RM 0.008 0.10 O.OSS 1.62 
WQRATE - 2,404 - 0.49 - 157.301 - 2.64 
cr 86.383 28.88 83.627 22.72 
R' 0.062 
log likelihood - 794.05 -2986.97 - 2324.45 
P 0.800 2.643 
quali ty is a nomla) good and provides evidence of the intemal validity of willingness to pay. 
Willingness to pay is lower for ruml respondellls and higher for those with propeny ncar w:l ter. 
General perceived Wlilcr quality is nOI a factor affccting willingness to p<ly. One conclusion with the 
independent model would be that the willingness 10 pay estimate lacks validity because of the 
statistical insignificllllce of the coeflicient on the quality variable. 
Next the water quality and willingness 10 pay models arc jointly estimated. In Ihe water quality 
model most of the coefficients retain their statistic:II significance. The coefficient on PROPERTY 
is no longer statistically significant. 11lOse who arc older perceive higher qualilY when the model is 
jointly estimated. In the will ingness 10 pay equation the coerliciellls on RU RAL and PROPERTY 
are no longer statistically significant. Most importantly. the coefficient on WQRATE is negative 
and st <ltistically significant. as expected. 111is indicates that as perceived gener.!.1 water quality 
increases. the willingness to pay for improved water quality decreases. TIle joint model provides evi-
dence Ihal the willingness to pay estimate has some degree of imemal validi ty: in other words. willing-
ness \0 pay passes 1I scope test. 
The correlation of the error tenns in the will ingness to pay and quality equ:llions. p. is posi tive <lnd 
statist ically different from zero. indicating th:1I the perceived water quali ty variablc is cndogenous in 
the independcntly estimatcd willingness to pay equation. The positive correlation is consistent with the 
upwardly biased coefficient on water quali ty in the independently estimated model. The result from the 
Bassman-type lest indicates that the joint model is appropriately identified (z] = 7.48 [3 df]. () = 0.05). 
Drillking Wa ter Qua/il)' 
In contr:lst to the PllUcity of statistically signilicant eoeflieients in the WQRATE model. seven of 
the thinecn variables have significllll t coefficiellls in the drinking wlllcr quali!)' model (Table 3). 
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Tabl!' 3. Wil lingness to Pay and Quality Models: WQDRINK 
Indcpcmkm Join! 
WQDIUNK MAXWTl' WQI}KINK MAXWTI' 
Coeff. I r:1I;0 Coeff. I mIlO Coer'. I Mio Coeff. I Mio 
ONE 2.374 14.43 40.546 2.41 2.303 15.49 257.185 3.95 
AI 0.000 - 0.58 0.303 5.46 0.000 - 0.56 0.275 3.91 
INCOME O.(lO I 1.6() 0.115 1.97 0.001 1.64 0.169 2.33 
RURAL 0.166 1.96 -25.340 - 2.59 0.179 2.12 2.398 0.15 
SEPTIC - 0.147 - 1.65 14.225 1.32 - 0. 135 - 1.50 5.213 0.34 
PRI VWELL 0.419 5.97 - 7.660 - 0.87 0.424 5.8 1 32.641 2.02 
PROPERTY - 0.107 - 1.78 21.645 2.97 - 0.100 - 1.64 12.898 1.35 
NilS 0.045 0.55 - 3.194 - 0.33 0.053 0.57 9.044 0.75 
PFI ESTER 0.110 1.49 11.823 1.35 0.122 1.73 20.985 1.85 
WATERS HD 0.010 0.14 7.235 0.82 0.012 0.17 19.394 1.66 
NONWH ITE -0.159 - 1.77 - 0.089 - 1.23 
FEMALE - 0.041 - 0.62 - 0.084 - 1.62 
AGE 0.006 2.99 0.008 3.85 
FAR M 0. 323 3.825 0.258 3.47 
WQDR INK - 10.R95 -2.35 - 96.147 - 3.89 
cr 85.989 28.89 84.834 22.26 
R' 0.22 1 
log likelihood - 784.56 - 2998.65 - 2328.78 
P 0.610 3.670 
Perceived drinking w;lter quality is higher for ruml respondents and respondents who get their 
drinking water from a privme well. Quality increases with ilgC and filml resideJll;e. Perceived willer 
quality is lower if the respondent is on ;I septic tank and if the respondents· properly is located ncar 
water. Those who arc nonwhite perceive lower wilter quality. 
In the independently estimated willingness to pay model. the coefficient on the tax alllount 
indicates starting point bias and the coefficient on income indic:ncs that quality is a nonnal good. 
Willingness 10 pay is lower for runtl rcspondenls and higher for those with properly ncar water. 
Drinking water quality has a small negative effect on willingness to pay. 
In the jointly estimatcd quali ty equation most of the coefficients retain their statistical 
signi licance. The coefliciellls on SEPTIC and NONWHITE are no longer statisti c311y significant. 
Those with higher incomes and who have heard 3bout Pjies/I'ria perceive higher water quality. Female 
respondents perceive lower water quality when the model is jointly estimnted. In the willingness 
10 pay equation the coefficients on RURA L and PROPERTY arc no longer statistically significant. 
Those who get their drinking water from a private wel l ilre willing to pay more. Those who have heard 
of the temls Pjiesteria and watershed arc will ing to pay more, Again, the income effect provides 
evidence of the intem31 v31idity of will ingness to pay. Most importantly. the cocfticicnt on 
WQDRINK is negative and statistically significant. TIlis indicates that as perceived drink ing water 
qU<llity increases the willingness to pay for improved water quality decreases. as expecled. The scope 
test in Ihe joint model provides evidence that the willingness to pay estimate has some degree of 
internal validilY. 
'ilLe correlation of the error tenns in the willingness tu pay :md {IUalit}' equations is statistically 
different from zero. indicating that the perceived water ljuality vitriable is endogenous in the 
independently estimated willingness to pay equation. TIle positive correlation is consistent with the 
upwardly biased coefficient on water quality in the independently estimated model. ·nle result from 
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Table 4. Expt.'Cled Willingness 10 Pay: Jointly ESlimaled Models 
WORATE WQDRI1'lK 
W~1el QUJhl) E(WTI' ) , ,,1110 100 \V11') , 0111'0 
Poor 287.83 3.23 253.57 5.12 
Fair 132.65 5.14 158.45 6.52 
Good 21.67 1.73 72.92 19.78 
Excellenl 0.41 0.32 19.22 2.23 
the Bassman· type identific::nion le\' indical c.~ that the joint model i~ appropriately idenlified (12 = 
7. 13 [3dfJ.p = O.05). 
lVi/lil/X'I('.'·.~ (0 Pay 
Expected willingncss to pay c~ti11l: ll es arc constructed fo r each of the jointly esti mated quality 
modeb Crable 4).7 Wil1ingne:.s to pay is assessed at each of the four perceived water quality levels. 
In the WQRATE model. willingness to pay dcrreases from $288 to SO as baseline w:ller quality 
pcrceplion~ increase from poor 10 excellent. Willingness 10 pay fall~ from $254 to SI9 as drinking 
water quality perceptions increa~ from poor 10 excellent in Ihe WQDR INK modcl. The range of 
expt."Cted willingness to pay e~ l imate~ is large. and differences are economically significam with lhe 
more appropriate jointly c:.timated quality and willingness 10 pay model. In commsi. Ihe mnge of 
willingness to pay estimales from the independcntly estimaled models is less Ihan SSO because Ihe 
quality coefficients are either ~ ... tbtically insignificant or biased upward . Using the inappropri:tle 
indepcndenlly estimalcd willingness to pay models would lead 10 a rcdu"lion in Ihe policy·relevant 
lIl<lgnilude of Ihe effect of qu.11ity on willingness to pay . 
6. Conclus ions 
My resulls indicate thai the endogenei ty of quality perceptions in willingness to pay models 
is ;! polcntial economelric problem . 111e cocllicicnls on qualily v .. ri '1ble ~ are bi .. sed in independently 
estimaled willingness 10 pay rnodcl~ 111;11 do nOI accounl for endogeneily. In joinlly estim:th.."d 
wi llingness to pay models . current quality has neg .. tivc effects on wi llingncss to pay .1S expected. In 
olher worth. rcsponde ills who perceive Ihat current wuler quality i ~ poor arc willing 10 pay more for 
a qu:tlity improvement than Ihose who thinl current w:ller qualily i, fair or beller. 
Policy :m:llysts require benefi t es timate, thai correslxmd to Ihe true, or objcclive. chlmge in 
resource allocation (c.g .. qual ily) that will fC~u lt from the policy or program. One problem that most 
CVM research face s is Ihat an allempi i\ made to describe Ihe objcclive qualily change to respondems, 
yet willingrlCs\ 10 pay Sla lcmcnt ~ arc made bast.-d 0/\ subjective qualhy. Willingness to pay estimates 
from CVM research would be improved if adjustmenls can be m:lde so Ihat subjcctive willingness 
to pay i~ con~blent wilh objet'live willingness 10 pay. 
1 n", c_~pcc!Cd ",lhnt;l1c's!O P-lY ~atuc" {'(WTt') '1'(l)(et'X, + 11.;0 + (f}.) ..... her.: L (et'X, + IXO/a.... 'PIZI"" (!.). 
OJ)(-\,~ the '1JJKlant nom"l dcn'lly (ullcl,on . <t,(·)" lh~ '1~lIdanl normal d"lnl"lullOl' (IIIK·1,on. :md (J" the "aodard error 
or t, .. E .. pecled "ill illt;llC..s 10 pay is C\"~lual~d a1 lhe IIIcans of the 'nOcpenocm ' -anat:>k,. X, and q. The siandard ~fTUI'< 
a~ cOI"lrucl.:d U""ll'he Della Melhod (Gn,,-,"" IW7)_ 
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CVM researchers should consider Ihe impl icalions of omined variable bias and endogeneilY 
bias whenever quality or other changes are to be valued by respondents and Ihere is the potential 
for a divergence betwccn perceptions and reali ty. For example. this issue might be especially im· 
pon:mt for environmental amenities Ihal gener.lIe nonuse values and for which respondents are nOI 
familiar (e.g .. preservation of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge). Modeling the endogeneity of 
Ihe change in Ihe resource allocation might especiall y be important when environmenlal risk is 
considered. There is much research that finds a divergence between subjective and Objective risks 
(e.g .. Viscusi 1989). Identifica tion of s ituations with divergence between subjective and objective 
risks is important for policy analysis. Valuation of these risks should consider their subjectivi ty and 
potential endogeneity. 
Future research should begin with a survey design focused on explicit descriptions of prepolicy 
and postpolicy quality perceptions. their delemlination. and the relationship between qualilY 
perceplions and willingness 10 pay. Also. fu ture research should consider joint eSlimation of qualilY 
perceptions and the Iheoretically preferred dichotomous choice willingness to pay. Another avenue 
for future research is the role of infonnation in minimizing Ihe divergence between subjeclive and 
objective quality and risks. Infommtion provision in the survey instrument can lead to improvements 
in the accuracy of willingness to pay as subjective quality converges wilh objective qualilY 
(Blomquisl and Whitehead 1998: Hoehn and Randall 2(02). Varialions in infonnation treatments 
could be used to dctcnnine the type of survey infomlation that would make expl icil modeling of 
quality and risk change unfk.'Ccssary. These extensions should help detemline when joim estimation 
IS necessary. 
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